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Public work programmes (PWP) are a popular part of development strategies and poverty 
reduction schemes and Bolivia were receivers of international aid for two workfare 
programmes during 2004 and 2006.  To analyse how well those two programmes have 
functioned I decided to look at cost-effectiveness and female participation in both 
programmes. The main reason to look at female participation is that according to one of the 
main financiers of both PWP, the Inter-American Development Bank, investing in women can 
have great effects on economic growth and poverty reduction. I investigate the four 
variables (labour intensity, targeting performance, net wage gain, and indirect benefits from 
the assets created) determining the cost-effectiveness of PWPs. I then compare the results 
with Ravallion´s theoretical model for cost-effectiveness in PWPs. 
In my study it became clear that the PLANE programme had better cost-effectiveness than 
PROPAIS, with much higher labour intensity and lower cost per worker. But the indirect 
effects of PROPAIS seem to have been much higher, just as the objective of the programme 
indicates.When it comes to the female participation it has become very clear that the 
characteristics of the programmes affect the outcome. Both programmes was carried out in 
the same context and at the same time and still the results differ from 82% in PLANE to just 
19% in PROPAIS.A simple targeting criterion with a fixed salary doesn’t affect the cost-
effectiveness of the programme in general but can have a huge impact on female 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
At the time researching for this thesis Bolivia was one of the poorest countries in Latin 
America with 65 per cent of the population living in poverty (below 2 USD/day) and as much 
as 83 per cent in rural areas considered poor.  In addition, income inequality increased 
significantly during 1997-2002, making Bolivia one of the countries in the region, along with 
Brazil and Chile, with the highest income inequality. (World Bank, 2006)   
Public work programmes are a popular part of development strategies and poverty 
reduction schemes. Bolivia is one of the receivers of international aid for their public 
workfare programmes. Workfare is more labour intensive than a programme which simply 
maximizes the present value of the assets created, because the workfare programme 
attaches positive value to the employment of poor people, independently of the gains to 
society as a whole from the outputs obtained from that employment. So a workfare 
programme will tend to operate at a point where there is a trade-off between the value of 
the assets created and employment. There are two ways in which a workfare programme 
might reduce poverty; the first is by providing paid work for the unemployed from poor 
households, and the second is by producing things of value to poor families.(Ravallion, 1998)  
During 2004 and 2006 there were two different workfare programmes in Bolivia: 
theNational Emergency Employment Programme (PLANE) established in September 2001 
and from January 2004 the Programmeagainst Poverty and for Solidarity Investments 
(PROPAIS).PLANE was launched as a temporary intervention, and then extended and 
incorporated as a permanent anti-poverty intervention, with the objective of generating 
employment for poor families in urban and rural areas. It is important to point out that the 
activities or projects that could take place with the financing of PLANE, were not part of the 
goal in itself, but were simply the instrument for generating employment. PROPAIS was 
created to finance small, temporary projects requested by community and neighbourhood 
organisations in order to create jobs in the rural areas. (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) 
To analyse how well those two programmes have functioned I decided to look at cost-
effectiveness and female participation in both PLANE and PROPAIS.  
1.2 Researchquestions:  
1. How cost-effective are PLANE and PROPAIS? 
2. Do the programmes succeed to target female workers? 
 
1.3 Purpose  
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To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of PLANE and PROPAIS I will look at labour intensity, 
targeting, cost per worker, cost per dollar transferred and indirect benefits for the poor. I 
will compare these results with both Subbarao’s cross-country data and Ravallion’s theoretic 
model for cost-effectiveness in public work programmes. Together it will show the cost-
effectiveness in PLANE and PROPAIS.  
The main reason for the second question is that according to one of the main financiers of 
both the PLANE and PROPAIS, the Inter-American Development Bank, investing in women – 
improving their access to information, resources, opportunities and spheres of political 
decision-making – contributes to poverty reduction, economic growth and good governance 
at the local and national levels. (Inter-American Development Bank, 2003) Surprisingly there 
are hardly any investigations on the gender effects of public work programmes. A lower 
female participation rate in the workfare programme could have negative effects on poverty 
reduction, economic growth and good governance. (Del Ninno et al. 2009, Ravallion 1999)  
1.4 Structure 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapters 2 and 3 are theory and methodology; chapters 4 
and 5 focus on labour intensity, targeting, cost per worker and cost per dollar transferred 
and indirect benefits of PLANE and PROPAIS, and; Chapter 6 and 7 focuses on the female 
participation rate. Then, in Chapter 8, follows reflection and conclusion of the study.    
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Chapter 2 Theory 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
As mentioned earlier public workfare programmes (PWPs) is a popular part of development 
strategies and poverty reduction schemes. According toSubbarao (2003) there are four 
variables determining the cost-effectiveness of PWPs. These are a) labour intensity, b) 
targeting performance, c) net wage gain, and d) indirect benefits from the assets created. In 
some cases, government requires co-financing from non-poor communities for the 
implementation of subprojects that benefit their neighbourhoods. In such cases, the budget 
leverage or the share of the government outlay that actually benefits the poor can be an 
additional determinant of the cost-effectiveness of the programme. But Ravallion´spoints 
out that there rarely are any private co-funding in PWP in low income countries, and that is 
the same in the cases of PLANE and PROPAIS so I will therefore look at the four variables to 
determine the cost-effectiveness of the programmes. I will then compare the figures with 
Ravallion´s theoretical model for cost-effectiveness in PWPs. But it is important to bear in 
mind some of the limitations of the cost-effectiveness calculations and associated 
simulations. So it may be helpful to obtain similar numbers for other programmes and to 
compare the cost-effectiveness ratios across programmes and counties. I will therefore also 
calculate the Cost per Worker in the two programmes and compare this with Subbarao´s 
cross-country data on Cost per Worker to get a picture of how the Bolivian programme costs 
stand in international comparison.    
To get a broader picture of the effectiveness of the programmes I will also add a gender 
dimension to the analysis. The overarching goal is to reduce poverty is closely linked to a 
development that includes both men and women. From a gender perspective, this means 
ensuring that both women and men are able to benefit from the new opportunities that 
development brings, that both have access to the resources needed to be productive 
members of society, and that both share in a higher level of well-being. (World Bank, 2002) 
PWPs can be classified into four main categories according to the way they address the 
objectives of employment and income generation to the participating individuals or 
communities and the creation of economic and social capital (Clay, 1986). First, there is relief 
works for rapid response to food crises. Second, there are the programmes which primarily 
target seasonal fluctuations in incomes. Third, there are long-term employment generation 
programmes, designed to cater for employment needs among the unemployed and 
underemployed, particularly those caught up in structural unemployment where alternative 
livelihoods are problematic. The final group comprises low-cost infrastructure programmes, 
with emphasis on the creation of infrastructure rather than income augmentation. (Chirwa 
et al, 2001)  
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Both PLANE and PROPAIS are in the third category – long-term employment generation 
programmes. It is worth mentioning that the objectives of a public works programme may 
well change over time. For instance, the Bolivia´s PLANE was launched as a temporary 
intervention with the objective to generate employment for poor families in urban and rural 
areas during the economic crisis. Afterward, PLANE was extended and incorporated as 
permanent anti-poverty intervention instrument in Bolivia’s national social safety net 
programme (Red Proteccion Social, RPS), created by the government in 2004 due to the 
prolonged difficult economic and social situation.  
The PWPs focus on income generation through employment as a poverty reduction strategy. 
Ravallion (1999) asserts that public works programmes can reduce poverty by providing paid 
work for the unemployed from poor households and by producing goods and services that 
the poor families value. Subbarao (1997) argues that PWPs as safety nets confer transfer 
and/or stabilisation of benefits to the poor, and using the poor’s labour to build 
infrastructure for development. The use of PWPs to foster rural development and as a 
poverty-alleviation strategy is evident in most developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America, and this dates back as far as the eighteenth century (Ravallion, 1991b)  
In countries where poverty is widespread, it becomes difficult to adopt a specific targeting 
criterion for public works employment due to imperfect information about the poor 
available to implement the programmes. Many, however, argue that the use of the wage 
rate for public works projects that is not greater than the minimum wage acts as a self-
targeting device that eliminates those that are not poor in the community by targeting those 
with low reservation wage rates (Ravallion, 1991a). It is important to strike a balance 
between the objectives of self-targeting and ensuring that workers receive a meaningful 
transfer. Too low a wage keeps the overall participation rate low, while at the same time the 
poor workers stay poor. There will therefore be no effect on poverty if the salary is too low. 
The wage rate also affects the labour intensity of the programme and thereby the 
percentage of the labour cost in the overall cost of the project. (Subbarao, 1997) 
The output of the public work programme is twofold: jobs of short duration for workers to 
increase their income, and creation of public goods in the form of new infrastructure or 
improvements of existing infrastructure, or delivery of services. Inputs are wage cost, 
managerial cost and material costs. The outputs in turn are expected to lead to three final 
outcomes (impacts): a) increased income and consumption-smoothing, b) a reduction in 
poverty and poverty gap ratio, and c) infrastructure development. (Del Ninno et al. 2009) 
 
2.2 Cost per Worker  
According to Subbarao the programme features (especially the level of the wage rate and 
the timing of the programme) and the design features (implementing agencies and the 
institutional framework) together determine the programme´s efficacy as an anti-poverty 
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intervention and its cost-effectiveness. The cost-effectiveness of the programme can be 
gleaned from the cost per job created, and the cost per dollar transferred to the poor. There 
are not much data available on cost per job days created, and the only international 
comparison belong to late 1980s or early 1990s, are shown in Table 2.1. Even though the 
data is old it gives us I picture of the cross-country variation – from as low as USD1 per 
person day of employment created in Bangladesh to USD8 in Bolivia.  
Table 2.1 Subbarao´s Cross-country data   
Country/Year/ 
Programme 
Scale of operations 
(million person days 
annual) 
Total Cost (wage 
&non-wage) per 
person day of 
employment created 
USD 
Labour intensity rate 
(Ratio of Wage Cost 




15 1.6 0.5 












Pakistan: 1992, CFW 5.15 2.8 0.6 
Philippines: 1990, 
CFW 
0.3 3.2 0.5 
Botswana: 1992-92, 
CFW 
7 1.7 0.63 
Ghana: 1988-91, CFW 0.5 3.4 0.2 
Kenya: 1992-93, CFW 0.6 3.0 0.3-0.4 
Bolivia: 1982-90, CFW 8-9 8.0 0.4 
Chile: 1987, CFW 40-45 0.5 -- 
Honduras: 1990-91, 
CWF 
2.5 1.0 0.4 
Costa Rica: 1991-94 8.9 4.0 --- 
Note: FFW – Food For Work; CFW – Cash for WorkSource: Subbarao (1997) 
 
 
Average public work programmes have a cost per worker of 2.5 USD per day. In Subbaraos 
data the cost for PWP in Bolivia is much higher than the other countries. He doesn´t gives 
any detailed explanation for why the cost in Bolivia is so much higher. Some is due to the 
labour intensity which is a little low, but not much lower than the others. The Labour 
intensity of PWPs is calculated by the labour cost as percentage of total cost of the 
programme. Del Ninno, Subbarao and Milazzo (2009) suggestthe following measures: Low 
labour intensity– less than 40%; Medium: between 41% and 59%; High: higher than 60%. It 
seems that the PWP in Bolivia 1982-90 was rather ineffective and did not managed to create 
jobs at low cost. I will see if the cost-effectiveness in the new Bolivian programmes is better.  
2.3 Cost per Dollar Transferred 
PWPs need to meet certain minimum requirements in order to ensure that they are effective 
and efficient, and do not yield perverse incentives. Ravallion (1997) suggest a model to 
9 
 
calculate the cost-effectiveness in PWPs. To estimate the share of the government’s outlay 
which benefits the poor – the cost-effectiveness ratio – it can help to disaggregate the ratio 
into various components which can either be estimated from the data available, or can be 
calibrated from seemingly plausible assumptions. He calculates the ratios for two different 
cases – one low income country (LINC) and one middle income country (MINC). I will just 
focus on the LINC case as Bolivia is a low income country.  
The proportion of total public expenditure on the programme which determines the net 
income gain to poor workers and can be disaggregated into the following five variables:  
i. The budget leverage. Let government (central plus local) spending be G, and let this 
be leveraged up to result in a total budget of G (+C) (if includingprivate co-financing 
(C)) 
ii. The labour intensity. Some of the participants may not be poor; so let the share of all 
wages paid in total operating costs be (W+L)/(G+C), where W is the wage received by 
the poor and L denotes leakage to the non-poor.  
iii. The targeting performance. This is given by the proportion of the wages paid out, 
which goes to poor workers, W/(W/L).  
iv. The net wage gain. This is the share of the gross wage received by the poor which is 
left after subtracting all cost to them of participating, including any forgone income; 
it is NW/W where NW stands for net wage.  
v. Indirect benefit. IB/NW where IB is indirect benefits to the poor, which occurs when 
the assets created are in poor neighbourhoods.  
The net gain to poor workers as a proportion of public spending on the programme, namely 
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        (vi)   (vii)    (viii) 
This gives IB/NW as the product of three ratios: 
vi. Poor people´s share of the social benefits from the assets created by the project; this 
is given by the ratio of the indirect benefits to the poor (IB) to the social benefits (SB) 
where the latter are assessed without distributional weighs.  
vii. The benefit-to-cost ratio for the project: the ratio of SB to cost, G+C.  
viii. (The inverse of the share of net wage gains to total cost. This can also be written in 










   
 
   
   
 
                                                (iv)     (iii) (ii)  (3) 
in which the labels (iv, iii and ii) correspond to the ratios from equation (1).  
Some of these benefits accrue in the future; this is likely to be true of the bulk of the indirect 
benefits from the assets created.  
With regard to Ravallion’s model there is no private funding or private cost-recovery (C=0) in 
PWPs. The wage rate is normally tied to a statutory minimum wage rate for agricultural 
labour. This wage attracts casual, unskilled, agriculture labourers who are not necessary 
poor and un-employed, according to Ravallion. There are therefore leakages to the non-poor 
although the forgone income is probably low. Ravallion assume the figure 0.75 for both the 
targeting performance (W/W+L) and the net gain (NW/W).   
In Ravallion’s model are there few indirect benefits to the poor, and he suggest that non-
poor landowners capturing most benefits from the assets created. However, there are some 
indirect benefits to the poor, notably through second-round effects on employment from 
higher farm productivity. Ravallion assume that the poor obtain one quarter of the benefits 
from the project. However, the high labour intensity means that the social benefits are only 
sufficient to cover one half of the cost (so B/NW=1.33).  
Table 2.2 Cost-Effectiveness of Workfare Programme under Base-Case Assumptions 
Budget leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 
Labour intensity: (W+L)/(G+C) 0.50 
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75 
Net wage gain: NW/W 0.75 
Poor people’s share of total 
benefits: IB/SB 
0.25 
Benefit/cost ratio: SB/(G+C) 0.50 
Gains to the poor per $ of 
spending: B/G 
0.41 
Current earnings gain per $of 
programme spending: CB/G 
0.28 
 
Cost of $1 gain to the poor $ 2.50 
 Source: Ravallion (1998) 
On plugging these numbers into equation (1) the value B/G = 0.4, so transferring USD1 to the 
poor costs about USD2.5. The current benefit ratio is 0.28 (this is CB/G, as given by the value 
of B/G when IB=0). Recall that the poverty rate in this example is 50 per cent.  
 
2.4 Gender Theory and PWPs 
The gender dimension of public works participation covers several concerns. First the need 
to provide women access to direct wage employment and to protect them from loss of 
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earnings. Second, women’s participation in the labour force and their control over resources 
is associated with substantially larger improvements in child welfare, and, women’s health 
and status. But women doesn´t just benefit directly from the PWPs, but the indirect benefits 
from assets created by PWPs can also affect men and women differently.(Del Ninno et al. 
2009, Dejardin, 1996; and Swamy, 2003).Swamy (2003) points to large variations in women’s 
participation in such programmes, depending on the general characteristics of the labour 
markets and the specific characteristics of the programmes considered.  
Gender equality is a factor that can affect effectiveness of development programmes. It is 
not just a matter of political correctness or kindness to women. The World Bank Report 
2000-01 and Integrating Gender into the World Bank Work demonstrate that when women 
and men are relatively equal, economies tend to grow faster, the poor move more quickly 
out of poverty, and the well-being of men, women, and children is enhanced. The 
overarching goal is to reduce poverty by promoting inclusive development. From a gender 
perspective, this means ensuring that both women and men have a voice in the 
development of their community and country, that both are able to benefit from the new 
opportunities that development brings, that both have access to the resources needed to be 
productive members of society, and that both share a higher level of well-being. (World 
Bank, 2002) Theories point out that the key factors for evaluation of the efficacy of self-
targeting in public works projects is through wage setting even though sometimes 
complementary targeting factors can be useful to ensure a gender balance. (Del Ninno et al. 
2009, Ravallion 1999) 
Several major World Bank reports provide strong empirical evidence that the gender-based 
division of labour and the inequalities to which it gives rise tend to slow development, 
economic growth, and poverty reduction. Gender inequalities often lower the productivity of 
labour, in both the short term and the long term, and create inefficiencies in labour 
allocation in households and the general economy. It also contributes to poverty and 
reduces human well-being. These findings make it clear that a gender issue is an important 
dimension of the fight against poverty. (World Bank, 2002)   
 
2.5 Gender Conditions in the Labour Market in Bolivia  
In Bolivia, in the period of 1992-2001 the participation of women in the labour force has 
increased, in both the formal and informal, paid and unpaid sectors. However, the 
continuous gender gap in income and in terms of gender segregation of the labour market 
results in a majority of women with lower quality employment and jobs in the informal 
sector. The relative progress recorded in the country in terms of GNI and other social 
indicators hides the evidence that Bolivian women, like those in the rest of the region, have 
had to endure further impoverishment than men and the greatest burden of the negative 
social consequences of economic reform policies, despite their increasing economic 
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participation. The gap in access to the formal labour market favours the male population 
(only 31% are women). In the informal sector the proportion of women is a bit higher, while 
in domestic work, women are 96% (INE 2003.) There are gaps unfavourable to women in 
terms of income, the national average labour income for men are 889 Bolivianos (Bs.) and 
483 Bs. for women and in rural areas 346 BS for men and 95 Bs. for women. According to a 
study by the Vice Ministry of Women (2005), 50% of the economically active women are in 
conditions of underemployment, 43% have low level of education, and a heavy family 
burden. 60% of women employed are engaged in domestic work, trading or selling on the 
streets. 
Table 2.3 Gender Gap in Average Monthly Income 
Gender Income Gap = Women’s income –Men’s Income (in Bs.) in adjusted prices 
 
Labour 
Market 1999 2000 2001(p) 2002 
2003-
2004(1) 2005 2006 
              
  
 
TOTAL -378 -367 -354 -406 -334 -504 -624 
Domestic -154 -262 -110 -222 -47 -6 -288 
Public -212 -298 -564 -432 -316 -739 -720 
Family -179 -154 -175 -211 -150 -230 -280 
Small 
Business -30 -138 -120 -131 -165 -94 -450 
Business -394 -484 -233 -506 -282 -196 -759 
        
Urban -521 -509 -520 -578 -497 -646 -843 
Domestic -79 -195 -119 -310 -22 55 -23 
Public -259 -327 -661 -525 -450 -933 -745 
Family -398 -279 -351 -402 -351 -463 -484 
Small 
Business 30 -97 -145 -142 -192 -113 -540 
Business -482 -564 -269 -598 -344 -270 -802 
        
RURAL -159 -177 -179 -251 -196 -263 -331 
Domestic -761 -629 210 106 -275 -405 -566 
Public 28 -220 -119 -189 -125 -229 -441 
Family -93 -121 -117 -175 -115 -133 -208 
Small 
Business -346 -383 -174 -388 -182 -424 67 
Business -317 -414 -350 -342 -504 -727 -1 020 
Source: INE (2006) data refer to the Continuous Household Survey, conducted between November 2003 and 
October 2004 
 
In Bolivia, as in many developing countries, it’s difficult to measure unemployment because 
many people remain outside the official labour market, and work as self-sufficient 
smallholders or in the informal market. During 2007, nearly 261,000 people were 
unemployed in the cities. This equates to 9.5% of the Economically Active Population. There 
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is no valid data for the unemployment rate in rural areas, partly due to a lack of information, 
partly because the vast majority of the population that lives in the rural area are self-
sufficient.  For these reasons, the national unemployment rate is not calculated, and there 
are only the rates for urban areas. (CEDLA, 2007) 
According to the Centre of Investigation ofLabour and AgrarianDevelopment(CEDLA) the rate of 
open unemployment in July 2010 was 7.6 per cent among males and 10.7 per cent among 
women. Unemployment is much higher in lower income groups and the gaps between men 
and female even higher. Among males in low income groups, the unemployment rate is 8.7 
per cent and among women, the unemployment rate reached 14.4 per cent. The study is an 
update (2010-2011) of the study conducted in 2005-06, with the conclusion that after five 
years, there was no significant change in the gap between supply and demand in the Bolivian 
labour market.(CEDLA, 2011) 
According to Inter-American Development Bank (2003) "underemployment in Bolivia affects 
more people than open unemployment, partly due to the expansion of informality, which in 
turn increased employment in low productivity activities".Poor people can generally not 
afford to be unemployed and therefore often engage in forms of economic activity with very 
low productivity (planting on infertile land etc.) and provide very little income. Depending on 
the definition used, these people are not classified as unemployed, but their situation is 
often as dire as that of the unemployed. (Lal et al. 2010) About 80 per cent of the labour 
force in Bolivia works in the informal sector and 65 per cent of informal workers are women. 
This is the highest figure in Latin America. Also, the value added generated by enterprises in 
the informal sector could be more than two thirds of GDP, and the World Bank calculates 
that is could be the highest level of informality in the world. Women entrepreneurs are more 
often in the informal sector, with smaller businesses that generate less revenue, all this due 
to their family obligations, lower level of education, personal skills etc. But the gender 
differences is not just in the informal sector, men’s and women’s participation in the official 
labour market also shows big differences – the women work mostly in domestic sector. 
(World Bank 2007) 
Table 2.4Labour Market 
Source: Berger (2003) Inequidades, Pobreza y Mercado de trabajo Bolivia y Perú 
 
 1992       2001       
  Total Men Women 
Women 
% Total Men Women 
Women 
% 
Total 100 100 100 42% 100 100 100 47% 
Public 15.5 17.5 12.7 34% 11.9 12.9 10.8 43% 
Business 21.0 27.7 11.6 23% 23.0 31.2 13.8 28% 
Small business 18.7 24.8 10.3 23% 14.4 19.2 9.1 30% 
Family business 38.8 29.3 52 56% 45.2 36.2 55.3 58% 




Chapter 3 Method  
 
3.1 Background 
There have been various PWPs in Bolivia over the past 20 years, many funded by large 
international donors. Swedish Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency)has contributed to the financing of PLANE together with BTCCTB (Belgian 
Development Agency) and CAF (CorporaciónAndina de Fomento). PROPAIS is financed by 
CAF and IADB (Inter-American Development Bank). The overall goal has been to create jobs 
and reduce poverty in Bolivia. However, there is very little material about the real effects of 
programmes. There is much documentation relating to the implementation, budget and 
decision-making and accountability, but almost nothing about the actual participants and 
effects of programmes. I will therefore examine PLANE and PROPAIS with regard to their 
effectiveness at creating jobs and creating positive effects for the poor. Although all donors 
stress the importance of gender in all activities there is almost no material about what 
impact the programmes had on men and women in Bolivia. 
3.2 Data 
I began this investigation by traveling to Bolivia in August 2007. Once in place, I met 
representatives of the RPS (Red Proteccion Social)/DUF (DirectorioUnico de Fondos), the 
responsible government institution for the implementation of both PLANE and PROPAIS. 
PLANE had recently ended, but I got a lot of information and data from DUF. I also 
interviewed several workers who participated in either PLANE or PROPAIS. My original plan 
was to do a larger survey with interviews concerning PROPAIS, but unfortunately the 
programme was on pause during the months that my research was conducted. This made it 
difficult for me to find workers to interview, but thanks to some contacts at DUF I did ten 
interviews with participants in the programmes. Three of the interviews were made with 
former workers in PLANE and seven who had recently participated in PROPAIS. Two of the 
PLANE workers were female, all the others men. I also interviewed Christian Rivero, National 
Coordinator at DUF.  
Due to the difficulties to conduct the large survey I decided to base my study mainly on 
quantitative data such as statistics from both the RPS and the INE (National Institute of 
Statistics), the economic reports from the donors and research about PWPs in general. One 
of the problems I faced was that there is very little available data about the participants in 
the programmes. DUF previously had had a website which was no longer working. During my 
trip to Bolivia I received some reports, excel files of participants and internal evaluations. 
Through INE, I received information on wages, working conditions and estimated 
unemployment for men and women.  
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Another problem with the collection of data for the investigation is the reliability. For 
example the estimated figures from DUF regarding workers in PROPAIS differ significantly 
from the actual data reported for 2007 and several of the sources reported number of 
registered workers rather than those who actually participated in the programme. This 
shows the difficulty of accurately ensuring the actual effectiveness of the programmes.  
 
3.3 Model of Cost-Effectiveness 
I am going to use a comparative method to investigate the cost-effectiveness in the two 
PWPs in Bolivia. Through comparison with cost-effectiveness in other PWPs I will see how 
the Bolivian programmes compare internationally. The comparative method also allows me 
to investigate the differences in female participation within the two programmes.  The cost-
effectiveness depends on following factors: labour intensity, targeting, cost per worker, cost 
per dollar transferred and indirect benefits for the poor. I will also add a gender dimension 
to the comparative analysis, with main focus on the female participation rate in the two 
programmes.  
Table 3.1 Model of Cost-Effectiveness of Workfare Programme 
 LINC - Base Case 
Assumptions 
PLANE III PROPAIS 
Budget leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Labour intensity: 
(W+L)/(G+C) 
0.50   
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75   
Net wage gain: NW/W 0.75   
Cost per worker* 2.5   
Gains to the poor per $ of 
spending: B/G 
0.41   
Current earnings gain per 





Cost of $1 gain to the 
poor 
$ 2.50   
Indirect benefits to the 
poor: IB/NW 
0.13   
Female participation as 
share of total 
participation   /   
   
 *Subbarao’s cross-country data  
 




   
 
  
   
   
 
 











3.4 Definitions of Poverty 
To be able to measure direct and indirect benefits to the poor I need a definition of poverty. 
There are many ways of measuring poverty, from the World Bank definitions in absolute 
terms, to non-monetary indicators as Human Development Index, Life expectancy, Female 
literacy, Percentage of children not in the labour force etc. But the most common 
international measurement is the concept of “USD1 per day”, an approximate economic 
value needed to acquire the necessities of life, as calculated by the World Bank. According to 
the World Bank Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. (World Bank, 2006)   
Many countries use a national poverty line based on population-weighted subgroup 
estimates from household surveys and thereby the definitions of the poverty line may vary 
considerably between nations. In this study I will use the National Poverty Line in Bolivia 
from 2007 that define poverty as minimum income needed to satisfy basic needs, and 
Extreme poverty as Minimum income needed exclusively for buying food and meet 
minimum nutritional requirements. This gives the following numbers:  
  Urban   Rural 
Poverty:  463 Bs. (67 USD)/month  360 Bs.(52 USD)/month 
Extreme poverty: 253 Bs.(37 USD)/month   205 Bs.(30 USD)/month 
 
3.5 Limitations 
I will investigate the programmes cost-effectiveness and female participation rate in PLANE 
and PROPAIS between May 2004 to December 2006. I will just investigate the transfer 
benefits. The risk-benefits, that is, the benefits of reduced risks due to consumption 
smoothing, are rarely factored into calculations of cost-effectiveness. Subbarao (2003) have 
noted that these risk benefits may be extremely important for poor people who lack access 
to risk-coping instruments or who cannot afford to insure themselves against potential risks 
of income/consumption shortfalls. If work is easily obtained at sites close to the homes of 
participants, workfare programmes can respond to risks of sudden shortfalls in consumption 
of poor households better than most other safety net programmes.  
Another possible method would be to calculate the effectiveness by comparing the 
programmes with other types of transfer programmes (food etc). But for this study, as I 




Chapter 4 PLANE 
 
4.1 Background PLANE 
The National Emergency Employment Programme (PLANE) was established in September 
2001 for a period of 14 months (PLANE I). The difficult economic situation in Bolivia led to a 
prolongation on two occasions, in November 2002 for one year (PLANE II) and in December 
2003 for two years (PLANE III). Since 2004 it is part of, along with PROPAIS, the Social 
Protection Network. Both programmes where aimed to conclude the implementation phase 
during 2007, but the timeline for PROPAIS was prolonged with two more years. 
(DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) 
Since 2001 when PLANE was launched as a temporary intervention, and then extended and 
incorporated as permanent anti-poverty intervention, it had the objective to generate 
employment for poor families in urban and rural areas. It is important to point out that the 
activities or projects that could take place with the financing of PLANE, are not part of the 
goal in itself, but were simply the instrument for generating employment.This means that 
neither the work itself nor its utility was part of the objective, unlike it would in the PROPAIS. 
(Sierra et al. 2006)PLANE had two types of projects – one for urban areas (PES) and one for 
rural (PER).  (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006)  
Although PLANE has undergone several expansions since 2001, the overall objective remains 
the same, that is: "Helping to create conditions that reduce social tension in order to 
strengthen governance and foster economic recovery in favour of the poorest sectors of the 
country through the creation of temporary income for the benefit of that population." 
(Ministerio de Desarrollo, 2006) 
The design of PWPs as safety net instruments depends on the ability of the programme to 
provide additional source of income to the most vulnerable population when it is most 
needed. This means that the design of public works programmes should pay close attention 
to the need for additional or complementary targeting method in addition using the wage 
rate as the key self-targeting instrument as well as length and timing of work. Specific design 
features also have an impact on the objectives of increasing female participation into the 
programmes. Lastly, community participation and involvement are crucial for determining 
the usefulness and impact of projects locally. (Del Ninno et al. 2009) 
According to DUF (2006) PLANE used the following tools:  
- Monthly salary below the market rate, (Bs.480 or about USD60)  
- Reduced hours (35 hours a week) so that beneficiaries may have additional 
alternative revenue  
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- Restricting the age range of beneficiaries, so as to maximize the likelihood that they 
will be heads of households with school-age children (age range between 25 and 55 
years for the PES) 
- In the PES, a lottery system chose those who would work between the listed 
participants. This allows a greater number of beneficiaries, while reducing their 
dependence on the programme 
-  70 per cent of resources available for allocation to projects of urban municipalities 
"PES", according to the percentage of registered people that were unemployed  
- 30 per cent of the allocation of resources for rural projects in the municipalities 
"PER", as defined in formulated in Poverty Law of Dialogue 2000. 
In the third phase of PLANE (between 2004 and 2006) approximately 120 000 people worked 
in the programme, many of them for more than one period. This could appear to be very few 
participants but the population in Bolivia is small (about 9.5 millions) and the total number 
of unemployed in the cities 2007 was actually no more than 261 000 persons. This equates 
to 9.5% of the Economically Active Population (CEDLA, 2007). So PLANE actually created jobs 
for nearly every second unemployed urban worker. 
 
 
4.2 Labour intensity  
The labour intensity of a public works operation reflects the percentage of the labour cost on 
the overall cost of project. It depends on a number of factors including the choice of the 
asset to be rehabilitated, the wage rate and the ability of the agency implementing the 
programme to budget adequately for non-wage costs. The Labour intensity of PWPs is 
calculated by the labour cost as a percentage of the total cost of the programme. Del 
Ninno2009)  
The third phase of PLANE was conducted between May 2004 and December 2006, and 
during this period the total cost for PLANE III was USD 20,169,490. According to DUF/BTCCTB 
89 per cent of the total sum were workers' wages and only 11 per cent other costs as listed 
in Table 4.1. The 89 per cent is equivalent to USD 18,030,175.(DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) This 
means that the labour intensity of PLANE III was very high.  
In Subbarao’s cross-country data the share of wages of total cost in most programmes varied 
between 0.30 and 0.60. While a higher share is desirable for higher transfer benefits to be 
conferred on the poor, many factors determine this ratio including the nature of the assets 
to be created, the duration and timing of the works, and most of all, the availability of 
technically and economically feasible labour-based methods of production. (Subbaro, 1997) 





Table 4.1 Summary of Budget Execution in USD 
Source: DUF (2006) “PROPAIS PLANE Red de Proteccion Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 
During the period 4,265 projects where implemented with a total number of 178,810 
workers employed. However, several of the workers participated more than once, so the 
total number of people who participated in PLANE in the period is estimated to 120,000 
workers. The number of projects across the country was not evenly distributed, with a 
dominance of completed projects in La Paz (28 per cent versus 14 per cent in Santa Cruz that 
has almost the same population). (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) 
Table 4.2Completed Projects 
Source: DUF (2006) “PROPAIS PLANE Red de Proteccion Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 
The difference between the total cost of wages in Table 1 (USD18.03 million) and total costs 
per project in Table 4.2 (USD 18,740,000) is due to not yet paid salaries and other 




 2004 2005 2006 % Total US $ 
Contractors 82,156 262,732 289,245 3.1 % 634,134 
Supervisors 96,502 151,251 123,298 1.8 % 371,052 
Administration 
CTB 
300,000 630,842 115,339 5.2 % 1,046,182 
Insurance 4,323 51,525 0 0.3 % 55,848 
Administration 
BCB 
262 2,777 228 0.0 % 3,268 
 
Wages 2,889,429 15,053,983 86,762 89 % 18,030,175 
Other costs 7,941 20,095 791 0.1 % 28,827 
Total 3,380,615 16,173,208 615,667 100 % 20,169,490 
Province Number of projects Number of workers Total Cost 
Beni 256 12,860 1,353,140 
Chuquisaca 479 17,150 1,865,721 
Cochabamba 644 33,360 3,328,919 
La Paz 1,088 52,240 5,442,753 
Oruro 392 13,990 1,413,914 
Pando 106 3,070 305,824 
Potosi 370 13,110 1,426,082 
Santa Cruz 724 24,360 2,707,500 
Tarija 206 8,670 890,322 




The targeting performance is given by the proportion of the wages paid out which goes to 
poor workers: W/(W/L). In PLANE the salary, Bs. 480 (USD60) for 35 hours a week, is equal to 
the country minimum salary and below the market rate. According to Ravallion (1997) a 
salary tied to a statutory minimum wage rate for agricultural labour attracts casual, 
unskilled, agriculture labourand there are therefore leakages to the non-poor. But, even if 
PLANE would attract casual rural workers the probability that they are poor are high because 
a wage at USD60/month is close to the national rural poverty line, and it seems highly 
unlikely that many non-poor persons would work at that wage.  
Of the 42,401 workers in PLANE III over 82 per cent were women. According to Sierra and 
Calle (2006) most of the women entering PLANE had never previously had a monthly wage. 
Female workers in PLANE had only exceptionally had paid work before, working mainly as 
domestic servants or in temporary jobs like laundresses, cooks, cleaning ladies, and pension 
or restaurant helpers or in informal self-employment such as street venders. (Sierra 2006) 
A survey conducted by MKT Marketing and PRISMA (2004) with 1,039 participants from 
PLANE, shows that the average participant in PLANE is a woman between 36-45 with 4 to 7 
children and with a monthly family income of less than 200 Bs.  
Table 4.3 Who participated in PLANE III? (In percentage) 
 PLANE III    
 TOTAL  Urban Rural  
Total 100 79.2 20,8  
Male 16.4 14.7 22.7  
Female 83.6 85.3 77.3  
     
Age     
<25 2.1 1.2 5.6  
26-35 29.4 29 30.6  
36-45 42.6 44.2 36.6  
46-55 25.9 25.5 27.3  
>55 0 0 0  
     
Nr. of children     
<3 12.1 11.8 13.4  
4 to 7 70.2 69.5 72.7  
8 to 12 17.7 18.7 13.9  
     
Average Family income per 
month     
<200 78.8 80.1 74.1  
201-500 15.3 13.5 22.2  
>500 5.9 6.4 3.7  




With a salary level equal to the country minimum salary and below the market rate and with 
the results from both Sierra et al. and MKT Marketing it seems to have been very little 
leakage to non-poor in PLANE III. This confirms by a study by Landa (2007) that shows that 
89% of the participants in PLANE uses their income mainly to buy food. 5.6 % uses the 
income to pay for their children’s school and 2.2 % pays their debts.  
It seems to be some, but not much leakage to non-poor in the targeting and I therefore 
assume that the targeting is 0.79 and the net wage gain 0.75.  
 
4.4 Cost per worker  
Various factors influence the cost per job created including the mix of locals and expatriates 
involved in the implementation of subprojects; the delivery mechanism selected; particularly 
the modalities of hiring private contractors; the wage rate; the capital-intensity of 
operations; and administrative capacity. Disaggregated information on the above factors is 
hard to come by; so it is difficult to disentangle the various factors underlying the variations 
in cost per job created. 
I start by calculating Total Cost per job created in the PLANE programme between 2004 and 




⁄       
The cost of jobs varies between 99 in Cochabamba and Pando to 111 in Santa Cruz and has 
an average value of USD104/worker. 

















Source: DUF (2006) “PROPAIS PLANE Red de Proteccion Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 




Total cost Project cost 
per worker 
Beni 256 12,860 1,353,140 105 
Chuquisaca 479 17,150 1,865,721 108 
Cochabamba 644 33,360 3,328,919 99 
La Paz 1,088 52,240 5,442,753 104 
Oruro 392 13,990 1,413,914 101 
Pando 106 3,070 305,824 99 
Potosi 370 13,110 1,426,082 108 
Santa Cruz 724 24,360 2,707,500 111 
Tarija 206 8,670 890,322 102 
Total 4,265 178,810 18,734,175 104 
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Total Cost for PLANE 2004-05 are $ 20,169,490 gives: 
          ⁄  
Total Cost per Worker a month 112.8 dollar 
     ⁄       
Total Cost per job created (   = 5.64 dollar 
Available data of cost per job created, which relate to the late 1980s or early 1990s, show 
much cross-country variation – from as low as USD1 per person day of employment created 
in Bangladesh to $8 in previous programmes in Bolivia.The value of USD 5,64 is  a clear 
improvement from the previous programmes in 1982-90, but still quite high in an 
international comparison. But to put cross-country comparisons in perspective, mean 
consumption per person per month has to be considered. The main finding is that not all 
countries manage to create jobs at low cost. Low-income developing countries in Asia and 
Africa – Bangladesh, India, Botswana, and Tanzania – have incurred a cost per day in the 
(modest) range of USD1-2. (Subbarao, 2005) But at this low cost it is hard to ensure that 
workers receive a meaningful transfer. Therefore it can be of more interest to investigate 
Cost per dollar transferred.  
 
4.5 Cost per dollar transferred 
Cost per dollar transferred or Current earnings gain per USD of programme spending: CB/G 
is calculating how much the poor will gain from the programme. There are few studies have 
examined the cost per dollar of income transferred through public work programmes. One 
of the studies are released by Concurrent Evaluation Report, the Ministry of Rural 
Development of India, shows that India´s nationwide programme (JRY) transferred one unit 
of income to participants at a cost of 1.9 (including the amount of transfer) in 1991. It is well-
known that JRY participants included the poor as well as the non-poor, largely because the 
programme wage was higher than the market wage. Taking into account the extent of 
mistargeting, the programme required an expenditure of 4.35 (including the amount of 
transfer) to transfer one unit of income to a poor participant.(Subbarao, 2005) 
In PLANE the monthly salary was set below the market rate, with reduced hours. 480 Bs. is 
approximately 60 USD/month1 . 60 dollars a month gives a salary of 3 dollars a day for the 
workers of PLANE.  
So according to my calculations the Cost per dollar of income transferred in PLANE is the 
monthly cost of project divided by the salary transferred to the workers: 
                                                          
1




         ⁄  
This means that although the cost per job created seems to be quite high compared to 
Subbarao’s cross-country comparisons, the Cost per dollar transferred in PLANE appears to 
be very low compared with Ravallion’s (1999) simulation analysis in a low income setting 
where the cost of transferring one dollar to poor people in low income with an average 
poverty rate of 50 per cent is equal to USD2.5 if future gains from the assets created are 
taken into account and USD3.6 if only current benefits are considered.   
With a cost per dollar transferred at 1.88 I then calculate the Gains to the poor per USD of 
spending 
B/G= 0.53 
Current earnings gain per USD of programme spending 
CB/G=0.89 
 
4.6 Indirect benefits 
In the design of PLANE it was decided not to finance investment activities by the municipal 
governments, with the purpose of preventing that the programme had served to replace 
investments that had been already planned, in order to ensure that the impact on 
employment would be additional. Thus it declared that only maintenance would be eligible, 
while maybe some of them could have been performed by municipals governments, most 
municipalities were facing major budget constraints, especially in times of crisis. In addition 
maintenance activities do not require skilled labour, thereby avoiding the exclusion of less 
skilled, especially women that typically is done in investment works. (DUF 2006) 
The major types of projects executed by PLANE were: firstly the Maintenance of roads in 
rural areas, with a grant of $ 4.63 million, then the Maintenance of public areas with $ 3.31 
million and thirdly Pavement works with $ 2.63 million. The work itself or its utility was not 
part of the goal, differing in this aspect from PROPAIS. This should indicate a low indirect 








Table 4.5 Type of Executed Projects in PLANE III (in million USD)  
 
Source: DUF (2006) “PROPAIS PLANE Red de Protección Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 




   
 
  
   
   
 
 














PLANE seems to have achieved its overall objective: "Helping to create conditions that 
reduce social tension in order to strengthen governance and foster economic recovery in 
favour of the poorest sectors of the country through the creation of temporary income for the 
benefit of that population." (Ministerio de Desarrollo, 2006) 
A very high percentage of the total costs were used for workers’ wages which gives labour 
intensity at 0.89. The wage rate in PLANE was equal to the minimum wage and this 
guarantees that the programme self-targets poor participants. This results in a good 
targeting (0.79) and just a little leakage to non-poor participants. The cost per worker seems 
high comparing to Subbarao´s cross-country data, but the gains to the poor per 1 USD of 
spending is high (0.53 comparing to 0.41 in LINC) and the cost per transferring 1 USD to the 
poor is just 1.88. So the cost effectiveness in PLANE III seems to be very good. But the 














the fact that the work itself or its utility was not part of the goal in PLANE and was mostly 
paving and maintenance work.  
 
If we insert in the numbers we get the following results:  
 LINC - Base Case 
Assumptions 
PLANE III PROPAIS 
Budget leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Labour intensity: 
(W+L)/(G+C) 
0.50 0.89  
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75 0.79  
Net wage gain: NW/W 0.75 0.75  
Cost per worker 2.5 5.64  
Gains to the poor per 
USD of spending: B/G 
0.41 0.53   
Current earnings gain per 





Cost of USD1 gain to the 
poor 
$ 2.50 1.88  
Indirect benefits to the 
poor: IB/NW 
0.13 0.06  
Female participation as 
share of total 
participation   /   





Chapter 5 PROPAIS  
 
5.1 Background  
On the 31st of January 2004 the government created Red Protección Social (Social 
Protection Net) in order to execute programmes and projects benefiting the poorest parts of 
the population. The RPS had three programmes – the already existing PLANE, the new 
PROPAIS (Programme against Poverty and Solidarity Investments) and PAN (National health 
care programme for children under 6 years). (Decreto Supremo 27331, 2004) PROPAIS was 
created to finance small, temporary projects requested by communities and neighbourhood 
organizations in order to create jobs in the countryside. (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) 
The programme objective was to help create conditions that reduce social tension and seek 
economic recovery benefitting the poorest sectors of the country, using construction 
projects with planning and implementation at the community level to improve the 
infrastructure conditions. The projects had to be rapidly implemented (maximum 3 months) 
and labour intensive in the poor municipalities. In the case of PROPAIS contractors who were 
not from the community were not accepted, which restricted potential contractors outside 
the target groups. (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) 
According to DUF (2006) the budget for PROPAIS during the period 2004-2006 was USD 
18,057,169. Of this 92.92 per cent was used to execute projects. In total 1,348 projects were 
financed by the PROPAIS programme from May 2004 until December 2006, for a total sum of 
USD16,928,958. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Budget Execution in USD 
 2004 2005 2006 % Total US $ 
Contractors  2,302 23,171 786 0.16 % 26,259 
Supervisors 5,141 316,983 17,245 2.00 % 339,369 
Administration 
CTB 
248,397 248,000 43,603 3.30 % 540,000 
Administration 
BCB 
249 0 137 0.00 % 386 
Evaluations 52 ,36 182,281 28,563 1.50 % 262,880 
Material 0 799 0 0.00 % 799 
Execution  2,751,992 13,872,171 257,944 92.92 % 16,882,108 
Other costs 362 5,006 0 0.03 % 5,368 
Total 3,060,479 14,648,411 348,279 100.00 % 18,057,169 
Source: DUF (2006)”PROPAIS PLANE Red de Proteccion Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 
The programme also had guidelines to target the focus groups. PROPAIS financed small 
infrastructure projects and/or equipment of neighbourhood or community public goods, 
located in marginal urban or rural areas, which contain an important component of labour.  
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 The total project cost should not exceed USD20,000 
 The execution time should not exceed three calendar months 
 Projects must be located in areas of low income  
 Projects should be simple in design and implementation  
 The projects could not be part of the municipality annual plan 
 
Table 5.2 Completed projects 
Province Number of projects Number of minimum 
Wages 
Total cost 
Beni 51 5,835 836,160 
Chuquisaca 101 11,530 1,652,244 
Cochabamba 277 24,885 3,566,155 
La Paz 500 44,599 6,391,233 
Oruro 114 7,399 1,060,257 
Pando 12 863 123,644 
Potosi 151 11,793 1,689,979 
Santa Cruz 98 7,005 1,003,854 
Tarija  44 4,225 605,433 
Total 1,348 118,133 16,928,958 
Source: DUF (2006)”PROPAIS PLANE Red de Protección Social – Informe Final Primera Fase”  
 
The difference between the total cost of wages in Table 5.1 (USD16,882,108) and total costs 
per project in Table 5.2 (USD16,928,958) is due to not yet paid salaries and other 
transactions that have not been implemented when the tables were made.(DUF/BTCCTB, 
2006) 
 
5.2 Labour intensity  
All the projects funded by PROPAIS was planned to be labour-intensive but in the report 
PROPAIS PLANE Red de Proteccion Social – Informe Final PrimeraFase, the organisation 
responsible for the project (DUF) calculates that at least 38 per cent of the project execution 
budget was used for wages. This level of labour intensity in a public works programmeis 
considered low according to the scales by Del Ninno, Subbarao and Milazzo (2009) The 
PROPAIS labour intensity is low also compared with the data in Subbarao’s cross-country 
report where the share of wages of total Cost in most programmes varied between 0.30 and 







PROPAIS did not accept contractors which were not from the same communities as the 
beneficiaries, (DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) But this did not guarantee that the contractor or his 
workers are neither poor nor un-employed. The fact that there are no guiding principles 
regarding wages open up for the possibility that non-poor had participated in PROPAIS. The 
targeting performance given by the proportion of the wages paid out which goes to poor 
workers, W/(W/L) is difficult to calculate in the case of PROPAIS due to the fact that there 
are no established wage levels in the programme.  
DUF makes the assumption that the 6.4 million USD used for wages was divided into 118,000 
minimum wages.(DUF/BTCCTB, 2006) In fact, the assumption made by DUF when calculating 
that 118,000 persons were working in 1,348 projects results in an average of 87 workers per 
project. But from the data I got from Red Proteccion Social I calculate that there were 42,583 
workers registered in 2,810 projects in 2007, which indicated a much lower number of 
workers per project (15.15).2 This of course affects the cost-effectiveness of the programme.  
The lack of salary restrictions combined with a type of project that may attract skilled labour 
probably resulted in leakage to non-poor workers. Ravallion’s (1998) results from field trips 
suggest that it is not always the case that the poor workers are favoured by local scheme 
administrators or contractors when deciding who gets work. I assume the leakage in 
PROPAIS will be at least the assumed numbers for LINC = 0.75 and the net wage gain the 
same (0.75).  
 
5.4 Cost per worker  
To compare the Cost per worker in the two programmes I will do the same calculations as 
for PLANE. In the PROPAIS programme between 2004 and 2006 the Total cost per job 
created was as following:  
Number of job created in PROPAIS (according to DUF) 118,000 divided in 19 months 
6,210.53 jobs/month  
  
  
⁄       
Total Cost for PROPAIS USD18,057,169 
           ⁄  
Total Cost per Worker a month USD153 / 
     ⁄       
                                                          
2
Excel file ”Trabajadores registrados PROPAIS 2007” (2007) RPS 
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Total Cost per job created = USD7.65  
But according to the numbers I got from DUF for year 2007 the actual number of workers 
seems to be much lower. If I do the calculations with only 15 workers per project (as in my 
calculations for 2007) the Total Cost per job created are as high as 41 dollar a day.   
     ⁄     
But as my study is for 2004-06 I will use the sum 7.65  
 
5.5 Cost per dollar transferred 
According to the report”PROPAIS, PLANE, Red de Protección Social, Informe final – 
Primerafase” DUF calculates that a minimum wage was paid to all the workers (PW =MNW) 
which gives USD2.7 per worker a day in salary.   
The Cost per USD of income transferred in PROPAIS is  
         ⁄  
This number 2.83 (TC) can be compared to PLANE 1.88 (TC) and shows that PLANE is more 
cost effective than PROPAIS. But in comparison with Ravallion’s simulation calculations of 
USD3.6 even PROPAIS seems quite cost effective in terms of transfers to the poor.  
But this cost per USD of income transferred in PROPAIS can actually be much higher if the 
number of workers is as few as in documents from 2007. With those numbers I got a cost 
per dollar transferred at 15.19 which shows that the actual cost effectiveness in PROPAIS can 
be very poor. According to Christian Rivero at DUF it’s also risky to assume that the project 
wage always is equal to minimum wage, when there are no rules regulating wages in 
PROPAIS. So if the PW>MW the transfers to poor can be even lower.  
But with the statistics from DUF for this period the cost per dollar transferred is 2.83 which 
gives a gains to the poor per USD of spending 
B/G= 0.35 








5.6 Indirect benefits 
PROPAIS financed small infrastructure projects and/or equipment of neighbourhood or 
community public goods, located in marginal poor urban or rural areas. PROPAIS had among 
its main objectives to create a rapid response to the demands of Community-based 
organizations through small infrastructure works and equipment contributing to its 
financing, and with the projects generating temporary employment among the country's 
poorest people. Also the PROPAIS aimed that through the submission and approval of 
projects to benefit the popular sectors, an establishment of relationships between 
grassroots organizations and the central government could be possible. Looking at the type 
of projects demanded by the communities, there is a significant concentration (28%) in 
Paving roads with 2,379 projects (reaching USD35.9 million) and multifunctional sport courts 
(12%) with over 1,980 projects (equivalent to USD15.8 million). (DUF 2006) 
According to Sierra y Calle (2006) it is reported that PROPAIS is highly valued by the 
communities in rural areas. It doesn’t just generate employment but also respond to 
perceived needs in faraway communities. This means that the indirect benefit to the poor 
could be higher than in PLANE.  





Table 5.4 Type of executed projects in PROPAIS  
 
 














PROPAIS’ objective was to help create conditions that reduce social tension and seek 
economic recovery benefitting the poorest sectors of the country, using construction 
projects with planning and implementation at the community level to improve the 
infrastructure conditions. There was no regulation of the wage rates in the programme and 
in the first implementation period there were no statistics on numbers of workers 
participating in the programme. There was much lower labour intensity in PROPAIS than in 
PLANE (0.38 comparing with 0.89 in PLANE). In fact, the labour intensity can be even lower, 
since the information I gathered about the participants in the programme 2007 shows that 
there was much fewer workers and that the salary appears to vary much within the 
programme. The targeting was at the same level as in Ravallion’s example, with just a little 
more leakage to non-poor than PLANE. The projects were executed in poor communities but 
with the lack of wage regulations there was some leakage to non-poor. The Gains to the 
poor per USD of spending (B/G) and Current earnings gain per USD of programme spending 
(CB/G) was much lower than in both PLANE and Ravallion´s LINC programme.  
But the PROPAIS programme had much stronger focus on the indirect benefits which 
resulted in a much higher value on IB/NW.  This confirms the idea of PROPAIS not just 
generating employment but also respond to perceived needs in faraway communities. 
Regarding Sierra and Calle (2006) it is reported that PROPAIS is highly valued by the 
communities in rural areas. Overall the PROPAIS had less cost-effectiveness than PLANE, but 
still quite acceptable comparing to the LINC case.  
 
 LINC - Base Case 
Assumptions 
PLANE III PROPAIS 
Budget leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Labour intensity: 
(W+L)/(G+C) 
0.50 0.89 0.38 
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75 0.79 0.75 
Net wage gain: NW/W 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Cost per worker 2.5 5.64 7.65  
Gains to the poor per $ of 
spending: B/G 
0.41 0.53  0.35 
Current earnings gain per 





Cost of $1 gain to the 
poor 
$ 2.50 1.88 2.83  
Indirect benefits to the 
poor: IB/NW 
0.13 0.06 0.64 
Female participation as 
share of total 
participation   /   
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Chapter 6 Gender & PLANE 
 
6.1 Female Participation  
Design features of a PWP can be adopted in a number of ways to encourage female 
participation (Subbarao, 2003). Women may be given priority at the design or recruitment 
stage. In a number of projects analysed, a minimum percentage of women participation is 
set in the project guidelines. The guidelines in PLANE had restrictions on the age range of 
beneficiaries, so as to maximize the likelihood that they will be heads of households with 
school-age children (age range between 25 and 55 years for the PES). And according to DUF 
(2006) PLANE has been effective in targeting fathers and mothers, including many heads of 
household in low-income sectors. But the guidelines had no gender analysis and lacked 
conditions to assure female participation. Despite this, over 74 per cent of the 9,608 workers 
registered in PLANE III (PES) were women. And among the people actually working in PLANE 
III (PES) the number of women was even higher. Of the 42,401 workers over 82 per cent was 
women. (Sierra et al. 2006) In the activities in the rural areas (PER) there are no statistics for 
the workers.  
I find the high level of female participation interesting, especially regarding the fact that the 
main activities in PLANE were construction work, which often is considered hard work and a 
masculine activity. I will in this chapter focus on the possible explanations behind these 
numbers. I will look at wage rates in the programme and in Bolivia in general regarding 
gender differences and the labour market and differences in unemployment between men 
and women.  








Source: Sierra et al. (2006) “Estudio sobre los efectos de los programmeas de empleo de emergencia en las 




In PLANE the salary, Bs. 480 for 35 hours a week, is equal to the country minimum salary and 
below the market rate. From the information gathered in interviews made by Sierra and 
Calle (2006) in “Estudiosobre los efectos de los programmeas de empleo de emergencia en 
lascondiciones de lasmujeresparticipantes” one of the main reason for the low male 
participation in PLANE, was the low level of wages. Indeed, for men the incentive to 












Women 74,197 74,4% 34,997 82,5% 
Men 25,411 25,6% 7,404 17,4% 
Total 99,608 100% 42,401 100% 
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participate in PLANE is less when they can earn more in other occupations. For women, who 
generally has much lower salaries the incentive to participate in PLANE is much higher.  
According to the National Statistical Institute 2006 men generally earn over 600 Bs. (USD75) 
more than women. In the rural business sector they earn over 1,000 Bs. (approximately 
USD140) more than women. (INE, 2006) 
According to a study by the Labour Investigation Institute Cedla, men represent 56.5 per 
cent of the employed in Bolivia; however, they receive 67per cent of labour income, while 
women represent 43.5per cent of employed, but received only 32per cent of the total 
income. The share of income that remains in the hands of women is less than half of the 
share received by men. (CEDLA, 2007) According to Sierra and Calle, the men who work in 
PLANE especially in urban areas, usually were people who have a harder time getting jobs; 
among other reasons because of their age, and many of the men participating in PLANE were 
about 50-55 years, which is the upper age limit in PLANE. In many of the interviews made by 
Sierra and Calle, the participants especially in urban areas, mention that is not always 
considered positive when men work in PLANE. The low wages are associated with a low 
value attachedto the work. (Sierra et al. 2006) 
In urban areas a high number of the female workers are heads of a household with no other 
sources of income than their own, as single mothers, abandoned, widows, and women with 
sick, old or disabled and unemployedhusbands. For most women entering PLANE it was their 
first time in their life they received a monthly salary. Female workers in PLANE had only 
exceptionally had paid work before, mainly domestic servants and temporary jobs like 
laundresses, cooks, cleaning, pension or restaurant helpers and or informal self-employment 
like street venders etc. For those women the wages are in a few cases equivalent to those in 
PLANE, but mostly they will earn more by participating in PLANE. (Sierra et al. 2006) 
"In PLANE they willhire us women, butelsewherethey do nothire us"(Female worker in 
PLANE,ruralLa Paz) 
 
6.3 Gender effects of the programme 
The massive incorporation of women into the work of PLANE had a double effect. On the 
one hand it has created a temporary relief of the poverty of their families. While you cannot 
expect families moving out of poverty permanently through PLANE, the programme has 
helped to solve the economic situation for tens of thousands of low-income families, at least 
temporarily. On the other hand, it has opened employment opportunities for women, which 
may lead to longer-lasting improvements of living conditions. According to Sierra and Calle 
(2006) the chances of obtaining employment after working in PLANE significantly increased 
for women. This is in line with the studies that show that PWP can work as a bridge to 
employment for women. Some PWP include training as a core component in addition to the 
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income transfer to encourage workers to acquire the needed skills to gain more permanent 
employment or become self-employed. (Del Ninno et al. 2009) 
After 4 years of existence PLANE had benefited tens of thousands of very low income 
workers each year, mostly mothers and including a large number of heads of households. 
Some of these people repeatedly entered the PLANE programme, and have developed a 
degree of dependence on these revenues.Despite its temporary nature it has begun to open 
spaces for women in formal wage employment. Most of the women in PLANE work more 
than once a year in the programme, which allows some learning and enhanced job skills. 
Besides the technical aspects, which are very basic, they learn how to work together and the 
functioning of a workplace, to coordinate efforts for a final product. Generating learning and 
experience for women with no work experience or previous training, and entering non-
traditional spaces, PLANE has opened up opportunities for women, not only for programme 
workers. It is increasingly common that women are hired as labourers in public works, which 
may indicate a contagion effect of PLANE. The PLANE work has shown that women can work 
in construction, public works and other works of common good (forestation, etc.). It can be 
argued that this is a rather perverse effect of PLANE to the extent that women do hard work 
for very low wages, helping to keep women in areas of poor quality jobs. But taking into 
account the options available, women valued work in PLANE as an alternative that can open 
opportunities in the future.(Sierra et al. 2006) 
 
6.4 Results 
The investigations made by Sierra and Calle show that PLANE has attracted mostly 
underemployed labour or those engaged in the informal sector, mainly women.This is in line 
with the investigations made by Professor Gutierrez de la Vega, (2006) who points out the 
underemployment and informal work as the biggest labour problem in Bolivia, and that it 
especially affect women. About 80 per cent of the labour force in Bolivia works in the 
informal sector and 65per cent of informal workers are women.  
Of the 42,401 workers in PLANE III over 82per cent were women, despite the fact that the 
main activities in PLANE were construction work, which often is considered hard work and a 
masculine activity. But the women as a group in Bolivia are more unemployed, poorer and 
receive lower salaries in the normal labour market and therefore are the incentives higher 
for women to participate in PLANE. So the high female participation rate in PLANE depends 
on various factors. First, the minimum salary resulted in self-selection of women to PLANE 
because Bolivian women generally earn less than men and thereby had more incentive to 
participate in PLANE.  Secondly, the simple tasks do not require any qualification or prior 
experience, which open up the possibilities for women who never before had a paid job. And 
finally, it seems that the low salary and simple tasks led to low valuation of the PLANE work. 
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This kind of attitudes seems to have had an impact in the incentives of who decided to 
participate in PLANE.     
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Chapter 7 Gender & PROPAIS 
 
7.1 Female participation 
There is very little documented information about the PROPAIS workers. The database of the 
RPS had no individual data on the women workers in the early stages PROPAIS and at the 
time of this study no evaluation of PROPAIS had been done that would provide additional 
information. In an evaluation study from IADB that was published in 2012 (finished 2009) the 
PROPAIS has generated 5,688 jobs during 2006. 4,266 of them were occupied by men and 
1,442 of women. (Sax &Cep, 2009) 
Also the information I received from DUF regarding the participation in PROPAIS 2007 shows 
a very low level of female participation. According to my calculations only 19 per cent of the 
workers were women. And in some parts of the country the participation rate is as low as 
1.3 per cent (Santa Cruz), where out of 8,984 workers, only 119 were female. When I look 
closer at the participation of workers in the PROPAIS project I find 324 projects without one 
single female worker and 249 of them in Santa Cruz region. But even though the male 
dominance appears to be greater in Santa Cruz, the gender differences are to be found in all 
nine regions. In a project in La Paz there were 395 male workers in a project, no female. But 
there are also some exceptions. In one singe project it was almost equal participation 
between men and women, and it was in a project in Oruro with 59 female workers and 63 
male workers.  
 
Table 7.1 Participation Rate PROPAIS 2007 























Per cent of 
women 
per work 
Chuquisaca 183 579 1,852 2,431 4 13 23,8% 
La Paz 821 3,319 8,384 11,703 9 22 28,4% 
Cochabamba 528 706 4,988 5,694 4 31 12,4% 
Oruro 176 580 1,198 1,778 4 9 32,6% 
Potosi 362 2,220 5,740 7,960 17 45 27,9% 
Tarija 148 87 2,144 2,231 1 40 3,9 % 
Santa Cruz 610 119 8,865 8,984 1 45 1,3 % 
Beni 137 549 1,253 1,802 7 16 30,5% 
Pando 12  - -  -  -  -   - 
Total  2,977 8,159 3,4424 42,583 5 25 19,2% 
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The differences between PLANE and PROPAIS show how the participation can vary 
depending of the design of the programme.  
Women in Bolivia often have higher incentives to participate in public works due to the fact 
that they are more often unemployed, receive lower salaries and often work in the informal 
sector. With this background it seems strange that in the same period very few women 
participated in PROPAIS. I will in this chapter look at some of the possible explanations.  
 
7.2 Salary 
In PROPAIS, unlike PLANE, there are no guiding principles regarding to wages paid by 
contractors. The contractor is the sole prerogative of selecting the workers to the project has 
been awarded, and decides the level of salaries. (DUF, 2006) DUF estimates that 118,000 
persons worked in PROPAIS between 2004 and 2006 and received a minimum salary. But 
those estimations are made without any actual information about the participants and their 
wages. In fact, the information I gathered about the participants in the programme 2007 
shows that there was much fewer workers and that the salary appears to vary within the 
programme. When the PW>MW the incentives for non-poor people entering the 
programme raise. The same will probably happened with the men, who choose not to 
participate in PLANE because of the low salaries. With higher salaries there are more 
incentives for men to participate. With higher salaries the possibilities for women (with no or 
little work experience) will be fewer.  
 
In PLANE the workers themselves could apply to participate in the programme. In PROPAIS 
however, it is the contractor who select his workers. In construction work, according to 
Christian Rivero, National Coordinator at DUF, the male labour force is generally considered 
to have better performance, so the contractors are not likely to hire women. However, there 
is a small increase in the number of women in the sector and according to DUF (2006) this is 
because, among other reasons, PLANE has contributed greatly to giving many women labour 
experience.But the overall male dominance in the programmecomes as no surprise that 
without any special incentives it will look as the construction market in general, with very 
little presence of women. 
The difference relative to PLANE, where the wage always was the same for men and women, 
there is no guidelines in PROPAIS on wages paid by contractors, which according to Rivero at 
DUF, has resulted in lower salaries for female workers than male workers for equal work by 
some contractors. 
 
7.3 Targeting criteria 
Subbarao (2003) points to the importance of the design features of a Public work 
programme in order to encourage female participation. Women may be given priority at the 
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design or recruitment stage. In a number of Public works programmes a minimum 
percentage of women participation is set in the project guidelines. In PROPAIS there are no 
conditions to influence the female participation as a quota of workers is based on gender or 
other criteria.(DUF, 2006) The guidelines in PLANE had restrictions on the age range of 
beneficiaries, so as to maximize the likelihood that they will be heads of households with 
school-age children. And according to DUF (2006) PLANE has been effective in targeting 
fathers and mothers, including many heads of household in low-income sectors. In PROPAIS 
there are no criteria at all regarding the workers.  
The division of labour between the sexes occurs in several ways in the labour market. The 
first is referred to occupational segregation and horizontal segregation. By analogy with the 
term "glass ceiling" this would be called "glass walls". It means that the distribution of men 
and women between the professions in the labour market is not the same, Women and men 
are unevenly spread between sectors of the economy. (Boschini, 2005) The kind of 
construction work that exists in PROPAIS is usually considered a masculine profession.  
"It'sgood experience for awomanto do men's work" (Woman in PLANE, urban La Paz) 
Another form is vertical segregation - often called "glass ceiling". It means that the 
distribution of men and women in various positions in sectors and occupations is not the 
same. (Boschini, 2005) According to Christian Rivero, DUF, the glass ceiling effect exists in 
PROPAIS. When there is some female participation among the workers, he had never heard 
about a female contractor in the programme.  
"I would never hire a woman for construction work. I have never done it and I never will. They 
don’t have what it takes to work here. (PROPAIS Contractor, La Paz)  
 
7.4 Results 
The very low female participation rate in PROPAIS is a result of the programme’s design. The 
lack of fixed salary and targeting criteria combined with high requirements of work 
experience resulted in a situation like the labour market in general, where few women work 
in construction sector. Unlike PLANE, where everyone could participate, the PROPAIS 
workers were selected of a project manager.  
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 Chapter 8 Conclusions  
 
8.1 How Cost-Effective are PLANE and PROPAIS? 
The PLANE programme had better cost-effectiveness than PROPAIS, with much higher labour 
intensity and lower cost per worker. But the indirect effects of PROPAIS seem to have been 
much higher, just as the objective of the programme indicates. 
In PLANE a very high percentage of the total costs were used for workers’ wages which gives 
a labour intensity of 0.89. The wage rate in PLANE was equal to the minimum wage and this 
guarantees that the programme self-targets poor participants. This results in a good 
targeting (0.79) and just a little leakage to non-poor participants. The lack of regulation of 
the wage rates in PROPAIS resulted in a much lower labour intensity in PROPAIS than in 
PLANE (0.38 comparing with 0.89 in PLANE). In fact, the labour intensity in PROPAIS can be 
even lower, since the information I gathered about the participants in the programme 2007 
shows that there was much fewer workers who actually participated in the programme. The 
targeting was at the same level as in Ravallion’s example, with just a little more leakage to 
non-poor than PLANE. 
In PROPAIS the Gains to the poor per USD of spending (B/G) and Current earnings gain per 
USD of programme spending (CB/G) was much lower than in both PLANE and Ravallion´s 
LINC programme. The cost per worker seems high in both programmes comparing to 
Subbarao´s cross-country data, but the gains to the poor per 1 USD of spending is high in 
PLANE (0.53 comparing to 0.41 in LINC) and the cost per transferring 1 USD to the poor is 
just 1.88. So the cost effectiveness in PLANE III seems to be very good.  
The indirect benefits to the poor are quite different in the two programmes. The IB/NW is 
just 0.06 in PLANE comes as no surprise due to the fact that the work itself or its utility was 
not part of the goal in PLANE and was mostly paving and maintenance work. The PROPAIS 
programme had much stronger focus on the indirect benefits which resulted in a much 
higher value on IB/NW.  This confirms the idea of PROPAIS not just generating employment 
but also respond to perceived needs in faraway communities.  
Overall the PROPAIS had less cost-effectiveness than PLANE, but still quite acceptable 
comparing to the LINC case.  
 
8.3 Do the ProgrammesSucceed to Target Female Workers? 
When it comes to the female participation it has become very clear that the characteristics 
of the programmes affect the outcome. Both programmes was carried out in the same 
context and at the same time and still the results differ from 82% in PLANE to just 19% in 
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PROPAIS. In Bolivia where the unemployment and earnings are much lower for the female 
population the effect on poverty reduction a programme that target women will have better 
results.  
It surprises me that the donors (IADB and others) who talk much about gender 
mainstreaming and the importance of gender equality do not analyse their own programmes 
and with regards to their gender impact. In an evaluation from 2009 IADB points out that 
maximum 25 per cent of the participation in PROPAIS during 2006-07 were women. But they 
do not ask themselves what effect this can have, despite that IADB states that “investing in 
women – improving their access to information, resources, opportunities and spheres of 
political decision-making – contributes to poverty reduction, economic growth and good 
governance at the local and national levels”. (Inter-American Development Bank, 2003)  
A simple targeting criterion with a fixed salary doesn’t affect the cost-effectiveness of the 
programme in general but can have a huge impact on female participation. And regarding 
the World Bank report Integrating Gender into the World Bank Work when women and men 
are relatively equal, economies tend to grow faster, the poor move more quickly out of 
poverty, and the well-being of men, women, and children is enhanced. 
 
 LINC - Base Case 
Assumptions 
PLANE III PROPAIS 
Budget leverage: (G+C)/G 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Labour intensity: 
(W+L)/(G+C) 
0.50 0.89 0.38 
Targeting: W/(W+L) 0.75 0.79 0.75 
Net wage gain: NW/W 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Cost per worker 2.5 5.64 7.65 
Gains to the poor per $ of 
spending: B/G 
0.41 0.53  0.35 
Current earnings gain per 





Cost of $1 gain to the 
poor 
2.50 1.88 2.83  
Indirect benefits to the 
poor: IB/NW 
0.13 0.06 0.64 
Female participation as 
share of total 
participation   /   
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